Where Wittgenstein says that:

“The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists — and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case… . It must lie outside the world.” (Tractatus 6:41) [recalled via Frames/Sing]

Whitehead rather says that:

“Everything has some value for itself, for others, and for the whole. This characterizes the meaning of actuality. By reason of this character, constituting reality, the conception of morals arises. We have no right to deface the value experience which is the very essence of the universe. Existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value intensity.” (Modes of Thought 111) [recalled via Stengers, “Thinking With Deleuze and Whitehead: A Double Test”]

So, the early Wittgenstein radically separates value (which he thinks is inevitably transcendent) from an entirely immanent world of unchangeable fact (“everything is as it is”). Whereas, the late Whitehead insists that value — in the form, not of fixed ideals, but of a process of valuation — is itself factual and entirely immanent, since it is inherent to every entity. Every becoming is a valuation. Wittgenstein’s facts are equivalent to Whitehead’s data. Data are what they are, because their process is completed; but this itself implies new processes, new subjective aims, etc., in order to take them up.